Security in Times of Terror
Policy options for Germany and Europe
18.03.2003 · Josef Janning
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Confronting the causes, structures and strategies of terrorism constitutes the decisive security challenge of our day, and must bring to light the new terrorism's unique and novel nature. Security policies aimed at responding to the terrorist threat need to be guided by the need to overcome the limits of purely national considerations and the traditional separation of external and internal security.
The current terrorist threat manifests itself most clearly in the form of the radical Islamic organization al-Qaida, which with its network-like structure serves as a sort of overarching organizational authority of terrorist activity. Anti-terror measures should not be directed exclusively at this organization, however. Neither should the actions of radical Muslims cause the debate over terrorism to lead to a polarization between Western and Islamic societies. The inclusion of the religious dimension in the discussion of terrorism calls for a clear differentiation: Islam cannot be considered the source of terrorist acts. Radical groups have instead hijacked religious values with specific sectarian interests to serve as a weapon against their putative enemies. Islamic terrorism's religiously oriented value system and notions of social order provide the legitimacy it needs in its call for the defense of the Islamic world against a western lifestyle characterized by secularism and hedonism. By tying their actions to demands for the preservation of their social order, terrorists are able to increase the likelihood that they will be positively received in the societies they claim to defend. A central challenge facing us as we deal with the specifics of the terrorist threat is that we avoid falling into the trap posed by a mentality defined by the notion of a clash of civilizations. Terrorism represents a threat that can be employed by a wide variety of different actors.
I. On Causes Goals and Structures of Terror
Planning global terrorist action requires a high level of strategic rationality. Successful operations demand that terrorists be able to dispassionately manage the cycle of escalation. They must know when it serves their purpose to further provoke their enemy and when patience and forbearance are called for. Terrorists do not have standardized or preferred strategies. Characteristic is instead the use of new, often innovative tactics appropriate to the specific situation at hand - a trademark which also makes it more difficult to predict what terrorists may do next.
The rise of terrorist groups and their readiness to commit acts of terror presupposes the existence of sources of conflict. These may come in various forms, such as, for example, ethnic tensions, ideologically motivated disputes, or the failure of the means of maintaining social order and the anarchy that results. Those afflicted by wars, civil wars, the tyranny of dictatorships, the breakdown of democratic institutions, and economic collapse often associate their troubles with the perceived dominance of western societies, in particular that of the USA. These conditions make fertile ground for the formation of radical groups who consider the use of violence a legitimate form of dissent. Terrorist groups that are able to effectively link their abstract goals with concrete demands increase their chances of finding a greater level of social resonance or even acceptance.
Terrorists make use of longstanding structural and developmental deficiencies in the Arab world, including a conspicuous discrepancy between rich and poor countries, as a means of legitimizing their campaign against the influence of western values and lifestyles. Weaknesses of existing government and social structures open up new fields of opportunity for radical groups. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan offered the most striking example of how an authoritarian state can hold onto power with the help of a radical organization. Such symbiotic relationships contribute to the further radicalization of the conflict with the West. As the case of Pakistan shows, unstable and inadequate state institutions provide opportunities for the formation of an environment in which terrorist groups can find backing and recruit new members. No generalizations should be inferred from specific examples of the Arab world's failed or miscarried attempts at modernization or its lack of democratization. Some Islamic countries - such as most clearly Turkey, or, to some degree also Indonesia and Iran - do indeed show signs of the development of democratic structures, though with differing degrees of success and internal consolidation.
The new terrorist threat expresses itself in various ways:
Motives: The motivations underlying and driving the most recent terrorist actions have nothing in common with earlier traditions of revolutionary action, such as those aimed at the liberation of the proletariat or the relief of oppressed peoples in the developing world. It is instead concerned with what it sees as a defense of its own system of social and cultural values against the rising tide of globalization.
Global Effects: Terrorist action now has a potentially greater global effect and represents a distinctly more comprehensive threat than, for example, the socio-revolutionary underground organizations of the 1970s (e.g. RAF, Red Brigades) or nationalist and ethno-nationalist terrorism (e.g. IRA, ETA).
Perpetrators: With the help of state as well as private benefactors, terrorist groups are able to draw on abundant financial, materiel, and personnel resources. They also possess a keen ability to discern the weaknesses of their putative enemies and to employ a mix of both old and new means in their campaign against them.
Massive use of violent force and a high victim count have become constants of terrorist action. Precise attacks specifically directed at a narrowly defined and limited target group no longer have the significance they once had. The symbolism connected to the murder of single, selected establishment representatives has been replaced by the employment of terrorist violence aimed at causing a high level of destruction. Through their actions of September 11, 2001, terrorists symbolized their ability to expose the vulnerabilities of the opposing order and to disrupt its operation. To achieve this effect, terrorists are willing to take for granted the killing of large numbers of people. A manifestation of power of this kind becomes a message in and of itself - a message directed both at those whom the terrorists seek to liberate and at public opinion in the West.
Terror organizations have abandoned strict hierarchies as they increasingly adopt more a network-like structure. Although it is possible to distinguish a group of leading personalities, they do not hold sole responsibility for the conduct of specific terrorist operations. Working within widely dispersed networks, individual groups or cells operate autonomously and in isolation from one another to carry out specific acts of terror. Organizational structures of this kind prove more robust in the face of counter-measures and are more difficult to eradicate than hierarchically constructed organizations. Because of their complexity and ethnic composition, acquisition of information about these groups is a laborious process.
One peculiar aspect of terrorist groups is a concept of time foreign to the modern world and in particular to modern democracies. This applies both to the formation of these groups and to the realization of their goals. They are not dependent upon quick and definitive successes, but instead think and plan in long-term time periods, in some cases extending over generations. This gives terrorists a clear advantage over political leaders elected to limited terms of office and forced to demonstrate speedy and perceptible progress in combating terrorist threats.
In view of the clear threat terrorism poses, one must take into account a whole spectrum of potential threats aimed at openly accessible and interconnected institutions. One needs to think the unthinkable in order to develop effective counter-measures. In planning and executing their actions, terrorists make use of modern information technologies, drawing equally on all available technical means (both high tech and low tech) in order to increase their operational effectiveness. The global integration of political, economic, and social processes has brought about an open and vulnerable system of mutual dependencies. This endangers not only critical infrastructures (e.g. transportation, energy supply, telecommunications) in western societies. As the attacks in Tunisia and Indonesia demonstrated, it is also clear that symbols of western mobility and western lifestyle can be targeted anywhere on the globe. Through their understanding of the dramatically increased vulnerability of the industrialized world, terrorists have been able to develop a novel battle strategy.
The recognition of the persistent and unprecedented scope of terrorist capabilities, in conjunction with the awareness of a multi-layered and ever-present threat, has global socio-economic repercussions. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, international financial markets were shaken, the insurance industry assumed major burdens, air carriers showed declining passenger loads, and the tourism industry suffered heavy losses.
Set against this backdrop, the role of spectacle - the staging of attacks designed with the goal of achieving maximum media attention - now receives special attention as part of terrorist planning. The amplification that these acts obtain via the media intensifies their reception by a global public. A characteristic of asymmetrical warfare is the use of news coverage and, especially, television images - images, for example, of the burning towers of the World Trade Center or the civilian victims of American air attacks - as an element of battle strategy. This has become part of the means of conducting war. In a series of cases, the display of violence has become an attack on the moral vitality of the adversary.
II. Shortcomings at the National and European Levels
In recent years and in direct reaction to September 11 various measures have been put in place at both national and European levels to deal with known security threats. The means and capabilities currently available are, for the most part, non-military in nature - though military means have also come to assume greater importance. With respect to the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union, it is apparent that the coordination going on within and between the different administrative levels has not yet been optimized to the extent necessary to counter terrorist networks and the risks associated with them.
The Civil Dimension
As in other European countries, the organization of Germany's security apparatus is marked by the various operational rationalities governing the military, law enforcement, and the intelligence services. Through a division of labor, each takes on a specific set of tasks and is provided with its own organizational structure, resources, and personnel. Germany's federal system of government and the doctrine of separation that operates to keep law enforcement and the intelligence services separate and distinct functions are examples of the peculiarities of German law not found anywhere else in the same form. With the German historical context in mind, a system of government took shape in Germany aimed at preventing the concentration of power within a single institution.
Despite the implementation of preventative measures and successes in investigative efforts, the limits and weaknesses of current structures are evident. To date, German anti-terror legislation has been based largely on the experience of dealing with domestic terrorism of the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s - to the threats posed by the Red Army Faction and similar leftist groups - threats entirely different in nature from those faced today. Proposals for dealing with the new forms of terror can be based only to a limited extent on previous experience. The establishment of the Koordinierungsgruppe Terrorismus (Coordinating Group on Terrorism) at the beginning of the 1990s, for example, served as a model for the Koordinierungsgruppe internationaler Terrorismus (Coordinating Group on International Terrorism) formed within the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) in 2001.
As a consequence of September 11, decisions were taken in Germany aimed at limiting existing threats and thwarting additional acts of terror early on. The first bundle of anti-terror legislation passed in the fall of 2001 allocated an additional 1.5 billion Euros to terrorism prevention. It also eliminated certain privileges previously granted to religious groups and religious organizations and made changes to the criminal code to permit the prosecution of terrorist activities committed abroad. The second bundle of legislation aims at strengthening and expanding the jurisdiction of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz), the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt), and the German Frontier Defense Force (Bundesgrenzschutz). It also provides for a tightening of the laws directed at aliens and asylum seekers and makes changes in the laws relating to alien registration, security screening, air traffic, passports and identity cards, as well as laws affecting associations and incorporation.
The range of threats resulting from the new forms of terrorism demands that proper safeguards be put in place for the protection of the civilian population. German civil defense structures would be utterly overwhelmed by an attack on the scale of September 11. Structures, organizational systems, and legal frameworks have not been sufficiently developed and coordinated to insure that they would function smoothly in the event of an emergency. Rescue services, fire control, emergency repair services, civil defense and disaster relief have not been set up and linked together in a fashion sufficient to deal with known threats. Moreover, the existing distribution of responsibilities between federal and state authorities could impede a proper response to a large terrorist attack.
The physical distribution and functional division of the institutions dedicated to the protection of national security hinders the collection and analysis of all available information. Current collaborative shortcomings mean that the entire spectrum of information held by the various security agencies cannot be utilized to the fullest. The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), for example, does not posses the capacity to assemble intelligence data from all sources available. Investigative work is often uncoordinated and redundant, with no consensus among those responsible for the conduct of security policy on how to proceed. Communications shortcomings such as these also encumber efforts to improve cooperation between various European security institutions.
The European Union has reacted swiftly and comprehensively to the new terrorist threats. Ten days after 9/11, EU leaders decided on an action plan for combating terror. In addition to an agreement to create a European arrest warrant and the establishment of the legal means needed to freeze assets held by terrorist groups, a number of other specific steps were also taken to strengthen the EU's ability to act - affecting matters ranging from flight security to civil defense. Moreover, the members of the Council also agreed upon a common definition of punishable terrorist offenses - meaning: intentional acts, by their nature and context, which may be seriously damaging to a country or to an international organization. The prosecution and prevention of these acts, however, remains the responsibility of the member states, and is to be accomplished in accordance with the legal guidelines in effect in the individual states.
Despite all the steps taken so far, however, there is still no solid consensus within the EU on how to combat terrorism. Different threat assessments result in diverging positions among the various EU member states. Institutional hurdles also impede the realization of a coherent response strategy. Individual member states possess different experiences and capabilities in combating terrorism. States that possess more extensive capabilities often have only limited interest in cooperating with states less enabled, resulting in divergent tracks of cooperation within the European context. This is a problem that will persist as the European Union enlarges.
The information gathering advantage enjoyed by some states is seldom equalized through cooperation with other states. Information exchange, in terms of both volume and content, is also influenced by the dictates of national interest. Problems in inter-state cooperation become more difficult when specific functions in one country are the responsibility of an intelligence service, while in another they fall under the purview of law enforcement. Domestic national authorities have also been slow to provide Europol with sufficient information. The fragmented approach to information evaluation constitutes an open invitation to security lapses, information loss, and delays in putting new precautions into place. Moreover, the constant increase in the sheer volume of raw data and other available information represents a challenging problem in and of itself - the resolution of which will be a long and difficult enterprise. The shortage of specialists is another problem - in particular, in the wake of September 11, specialists with a knowledge of Arabic and its various dialects.
Due to the reservations of some member states have against an overly strong European role, steps taken by Europe as a whole have, so far, served a mainly supplementary role to those taken at the national level. There continue to be differing national perceptions regarding the legal definition of criminal acts to be prosecuted as terrorism. The creation of a European arrest warrant proved a difficult undertaking, and national misgivings about the framework agreement for the establishment of common investigative groups have still not been fully put to rest. A broad transfer of operational jurisdiction to Europol raises constitutional problems in several member states. In general, common European action lacks a clear definition of the legal foundations on which to proceed.
European counter terrorist measures represent an effort to connect the three fundamental "pillars" of European policy. But the majority of measures already agreed to are connected solely to the third pillar (Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) of the EU's treaty framework. What is missing are parallel measures associated with the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and first (European Community) pillars. In this context, it has become necessary to question the continued usefulness of the unanimity principle governing decision-making at the European level. But it is not only the current EU member states who view with skepticism any further integration of justice and home affairs. There is also insufficient support for such steps among the candidates for EU membership. Calls for greater cooperation between internal and external security institutions remain largely declaratory in character.
Germany's lack of a crisis management structure and the distribution of state responsibility that grew out of the Cold War - with civil defense responsibilities lodged at the federal level and emergency management in the hands of German Länder authorities - make more difficult the development of effective protective measures against the new security threats. Therefore, in addition to non-military capabilities, military capabilities must also be taken into consideration. With the first invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty on October 2, 2001, and following the start of the multinational operation Enduring Freedom, military action became part of the overall strategy directed against the terrorist threat. In general, however, military and non-military measures still operate on parallel tracks rather than in concert as part of a blending of diverse capabilities.
As part of its role in Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bundeswehr has contributed air transport, medical personnel, ABC defense teams, special operations units, along with naval and air forces and various support services. The transformation of the European security architecture and the new security policy challenges require that modifications be made to the overall mission currently assigned to the German armed forces - which remains focused mainly on the defense of German territory against attacks from beyond its borders. A final clarification of the Bundeswehr's future role within a globalized security structure is still pending. But it is already clear that the task of insuring Germany's security can only be accomplished within an international framework. The reorientation of Germany's military role requires a source of legitimacy that operates on both the national and international levels.
Military action in the context of the new security threats requires a change in attitude. Conventional deterrence is only minimally effective against unlocalized threats - threats which may come from both non-state actors or terrorists. Security will not be achieved solely by means of territorial defense. In a globalized world, the division between external and internal security has been dissolved. The NATO framework provides for a high degree of integration of international military capabilities. But cooperation between NATO and the EU remains a difficult undertaking.
A serious impediment to the activation of operationally comprehensive military contingencies arises out of a double capabilities gap: 1) The armed forces of the various EU member states possess different capacities and means of crisis management. This creates coordination problems that hinder concerted effort. Moreover, it harbors the danger of a split within Europe between those countries that are both willing and able to act, on the one hand, and those that are willing but unable to act, on the other. 2) The capabilities gap between the US and Europe is growing ever larger. Europe cannot strive to achieve the same technological or financial resources available to American military planners. But without clearly perceptible movement toward convergence, accommodation, and continued development of the defense capabilities of a widening EU, Europe and America will continue to drift further apart - and Europe's dependence on the United States will continue to increase.
Inadequate and failed efforts at integration in Germany and in Europe - in particular of the Muslim population - intensifies polarization between different religious and cultural groups. Inadequate integration strategies at the national level and a lack of coordination of integration policies across Europe create "gray zones" within which terrorist groups can recruit new members, find sanctuary, and make preparations for attacks. Terrorists make extensive use of such environments, because it allows them an opportunity to operate unnoticed while planning their actions.
In this context, the problem of the diaspora plays a significant role. There are within the European Union and other western countries certain regional patterns of affiliation among third-country nationals: Moroccans in Spain, Tunisians in Italy, Algerians in France, Turks and Kurds in Germany. Within these ethnic milieus there is a high degree of interest in the political, economic, and social developments in their respective home countries. If integration (both of groups and of single individuals) fails to take place and if the cultural, religious, and social divergences in lifestyle that prevail in the home country and in the diaspora cannot be bridged, lasting effects on the psycho-social disposition of certain members of these groups may be the result. This situation provides an opportunity for identity-forming political and religious ideas and actors to exercise their influence. Under these circumstances, political consciousness-formation goes hand-in-hand with the religiously motivated search for meaning in life.
III. Policy Recommendations for Germany and Europe
In view of the seriousness of the new security threats, effective strategies of response are essential. The success of these strategies will depend on providing a foundation based on a comprehensive security concept and on finding a point-of-departure beyond national differences. A further prerequisite for the containment of the terrorist threat lies in understanding the interacting motivations previously mentioned along with the multilayered and interlocking structures of terrorist groups, then determining how best to begin to counteract them. A comprehensive and promising security concept emerges from the networking of internal and external security - a task which must be accompanied by a willingness to respect and preserve the democratic and constitutional order on both the national and European levels.
1. National Security Advisor
The position of National Security Advisor should be established as part of the office of the Chief-of-Staff in the German Chancellor's office. His/her responsibilities would include:
Coordinating the work of the Federal Intelligence Service, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and the Office of Criminal Investigation in matters affecting state security.
Analyzing the current security environment, and, when necessary, issuing security alerts.
Coordinating the activities of federal and state agencies responsible for civil defense and emergency management (including preparation of short-term warning systems and readiness plans to deal with the acts of sabotage and terror).
Requires strengthening of public awareness and clear definition of the National Security Advisor´s role. Decision makers have to prepare the ground for the establishment of this position both politically and practically. The National Security Advisor needs a clear mandate and definition of responsibilities/tasks.
2. Cooperation Between Security Institutions
The pronounced tendency toward compartmentalization and "turf-protection" among the Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA), the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) needs to be overcome in order to effect greater cooperation, in both planning and implementation. In addition to expanding the work of the existing consultative groups operating between the Attorney General's office, the Office of Criminal Investigation, and the intelligence service, a joint database system should be created to combine critical information on homeland security. While in peacetime, each of the services would only have access to its own data, instant full access to all information would be available in situations of emergency
The Grundgesetz (Basic Law) establishes a rather restrictive framework of action for the Bundeswehr, both domestically and internationally. While force projection abroad can take place under alliance terms and in self-defense, domestic use of the armed forces is currently restricted to events of a state of emergency. In order to protect critical infrastructure, to gather intelligence and to function as an integral part of a homeland defense scheme, the armed forces should also become operational within Germany under a new and confined mandate by the constitution. The crucial challenge for the Bundeswehr will consist of achieving optimum adaptation to the changed security environment - by means of increased professionalization and integration into the European context. The Bundeswehr's new security role must be reflected in an expanded spectrum of capabilities - from territorial defense to worldwide operations by specialized crisis reaction forces. These must be properly conveyed to the general public in order to provide for sufficient acceptance and support.
4. The Central Role of the Frontier Defense Force
The German Frontier Defense Force (BGS) combines aspects of military and law enforcement in the way it approaches planning, in its organizational structure, and in the methods it employs. Because of the way it blends both domestically oriented and externally directed missions, it is well suited to serve as an element intertwining both aspects of the national security apparatus. A proper appreciation of this linking function, however, is made more difficult by the fact that the German Frontier Defense Force is unique in nature; other states do not possess similar institutions. The challenge will be to integrate the BGS into a system of international cooperation and collaboration. Due to its unique experience in this area, the BGS should be given a central role in the development of a European Frontier Protection Force.
5. Emergency Management and Civil Defense
Though a European action-plan for emergency management already exists, the member states have not made sufficient use of all available opportunities for coordinating emergency management at the European level. This is partly the result of inadequate information among the member states. Those measures already initiated that are aimed specifically at optimizing coordination and response rates should continue to be promoted. National and international emergency management programs should be tied into a coherent European framework. Scenarios for dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks (whether nuclear, biological, or chemical in nature) should receive greater attention in the development of emergency management measures.
Strengthening of inter-institutional cooperation should not be limited to security institutions only but also to other multilateral bodies such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations active in this field to foster transpareny and closer cooperation.
Personnel decisions to strengthen these institutions or to conduct adequate training programs is another necessary step towards implementation of a coherent security policy
6. Containing Terrorist Support Structures in Germany and Europe
Under the protection of ethnic and other groups closed to outsiders, terrorists can create structures within which they obtain support, recruit the like-minded, and prepare attacks. Bonds of language, religious belief, and social tradition in force within such groups, together with a general distrust of outsiders, promote an intense sense of solidarity, making it more difficult to acquire information about these groups. Time pressure, in particular, leads to less than optimum results in the pursuit of appropriate responses. Surveillance must therefore be conducted with a view toward continuity over the long-term. Prevention must occur early on and in as direct a manner as possible -- by, for example, scrutinizing the various forms of political and religious indoctrination taking place in mosques and Koran schools. Supplementary information can be drawn from area specialists and other analysts, as well as linguists, scholars of Islam, and banking experts. The information thus obtained can then be joined together in order to provide early detection of the particularities of the network structures.
7. Policies of Migration and Integration
Integration efforts can also contribute to a weakening of terrorist support structures, because it is apparent that deficiencies in integration are partly responsible for the genesis of potential perpetrators of terrorist acts. The forms and means of achieving integration must be revalued, in order to determine where problems lie and how to promote mutual acceptance. Efforts should continue, for example, to include Islamic instruction as part of the religious curriculum offered in German public schools. Furthermore, national approaches to immigration should be further harmonized within a more coherently fashioned EU framework. Policies relating to immigration were brought within the common European structures through the Treaty of Amsterdam, but there continue to be implementation problems at the national level. The synchronization of immigration policies must be understood as part of a preventive integration strategy. To that end, the push to establish regulations governing the admission of applicants for asylum, the asylum-granting process itself, the status of refugees, and the status of third-country dependents, planned for 2004, should be strengthened.
8. Strengthening EU homeland security
Domestic security within Germany cannot be achieved separate from the rest of Europe. A clear definition of the tasks and priorities related to the fight against terrorism would be prudent in order to better utilize the capabilities of Europol, Eurojust, and the Task Force of Chiefs-of-Police. Regular meetings between these key groups should also be established in order to provide them with an opportunity to provide the Council with joint new initiatives in the ongoing development of practical means for improving judicial and police cooperation. Of central importance is a guarantee of comprehensive access by Europol and Eurojust to data and other information held by national authorities. These authorities should be obliged to forward relevant information -- within the limits imposed by data privacy laws. Counter-measures against terrorist threats should be inserted as express goals in each of the three pillars of the EU treaty framework. In order to strengthen operational capacities, the work of the Task Force of Chiefs-of-Police should be directed toward an evaluation of the opportunities for planning and conducting joint anti-terror operations. Lastly, an expansion of joint training programs in anti-terror methods (directed in particular at law enforcement officials and district attorneys) could be valuable. Its aim would be to identify best practices both within and outside the EU, could be of considerable benefit.
9. Re-balancing Security and Privacy
The expansion of security policy competencies at both national and European levels requires that adequate consideration be given to the problems of public acceptance and data protection. There must be a broad public airing of questions relating to freedom, security, and justice, in order to create adequate public acceptance of new terrorist measures - especially since the terrorist threat is directed at western society's openness and social order. Many of the steps taken to combat terrorism will only find public approval if the response can per perceived as proportionate to the challenge. The collection, transfer, and storage of data should be guided by the conditions set down in law. With regard to the EU, the consultation procedure, where the Council refers proposals for legislation to Parliament for an opinion, should be expanded to include the review of non-legally-binding program documents originating from the Council. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the question of where to grant the European Parliament additional rights of co-decision.
10. Stabilizing EU Neighbors
The European Union is increasingly developing the capacity to assume a global security role. One of its primary foreign and security policy tasks lies in the assistance and stabilization of those regions on the periphery of an enlarging EU. The expansion of the EU will create new frontiers that run adjacent to states and regions characterized by crisis and instability. With respect to regional policies, current mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation with the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Mediterranean basin should be enhanced -- for example by taking up with them matters relating to socio-economic conditions and the situation of ethnic and religious minorities, with the purpose of initiating and promoting measures meant to encourage greater stability.
11. EU Enlargement
The expansion of the European Union promotes European stability. Prospective EU member states are already working to support the EU's anti-terror measures. With a view to EU enlargement and to its relations with third-party states, current positions and practices should be further developed and new ones agreed to. Turkey takes on a special role in this regard. Turkey's close association with the EU and its prospect for EU membership promotes not only rapprochement between religious faiths, it also strengthens a secular order in an Islamic society. If the Turkish example will prove that different political, social, and economic interests can be brought together in a way mutually beneficial to all, the effect will not go unnoticed in other Islamic states.
12. Adapting CFSP / ESDP
Within the CFSP / ESDP framework, the EU has a broad spectrum of security mechanisms at its disposal - which, in association with the mechanisms contained in the first and second pillars of the EU treaty framework, provides elements of external direction. A common strategy on anti-terror measures should be concluded within the CFSP framework. A systematic and regular assessment of the external dimension of internal security can find expression in a half-yearly strategy paper on security. Cooperation in terrorism prevention should also be incorporated as an obligation in relations with third-party countries. The expansion of the mechanism of enhanced cooperation within the CFSP is indispensable in order to reduce impediments to decision-making in European foreign and security policies. The Petersberg-Tasks were not originally conceived for the purpose of combating terrorism, but they do offer a flexible structure that can also be used for anti-terror measures.
13. Middle East Policy
An end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not bring about the demise of radical Islamic terrorism. But it would make it possible to reduce the legitimacy of and the willingness to support terrorist organizations in the neighborhood. The EU must work with the United States, Russia, the United Nations, as well as with regional actors such as Egypt and Jordan, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides in the conflict. In addition to bilateral cooperation conducted within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean OSCE should also be further developed. A security policy directed toward the Middle East and Gulf Region must also pay heed to the development of all the states in the region - not only the so-called "at-risk" states. This includes taking another look at supposed allies, like Saudi Arabia, and its role in supporting radical Islamic groups. Accordingly, while taking into account the respective circumstances, diplomatic pressure should be brought to bear against such states, where necessary. Conversely, states with weak central authority should be given aid and assistance in implementing political, economic and social reform.
14. Critical Dialogue
Any examination of causes and motivations of terrorism must have the support of the states and regions concerned. It should be determined which elements within Islamic states may be open to reforms. The dialogue with the Arab and Islamic world - and here the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue will also play an important role - cannot avoid dealing with a range of problem areas, such as, for example, the lack of democratic institutions and practices, press freedom, equal rights for women, education and children's affairs, as well as the protection of minorities. A critical and carefully directed dialogue in which cooperative and supportive efforts are conditioned on adherence to the rights listed above, is important to establish the credibility of German and European policies vis-à-vis third-party states. Alongside a dialogue among elites, there should also be an intensive exchange of opinions between representatives of the academic middle-class and other non-governmental actors. Avoiding double standards is crucial to any critical dialogue - in the interpretation of human rights, for example. By the same token, western models should not be forced on unwilling recipients.
The traditional distinction made between internal and external security cannot be maintained. In view of the newly emerging threat scenarios and the means available for dealing with them, law enforcement, intelligence services and military means have moved closer together in function, and may even occasionally overlap. In accordance with a networking approach, there is need for extensive cooperation between security institutions at both the national and European levels, along with an improved division of labor, specialization and differentiation aimed at reciprocal optimization between security institutions (with simultaneous recognition of the need for a fundamental separation of those institutions). A transnational network must be flexibly organized so that it can dovetail with and make allowances for differing national realities. Conversely, there is also need for a critical examination of national particularities as they relate to the demands of international cooperation.
At the European level, a blending of internal and external efforts means an increase in the mutually reinforcing interactions between the three pillars of the EU treaty framework. In the framework established by the EU treaty, the EU has a range of instruments at its disposal - with respect to both the internal market as well as foreign trade relationships - that can complement the anti-terror objectives established by the framework laid down in Title VI EUV (third pillar). Additionally, there are also the security policy opportunities provided by CFSP / ESDP (second pillar).
Achieving international security also means finding clear and conclusive answers to questions about the mutually binding formulation of international law, the reform of the UN Security Council, along with issues of arms control and disarmament. Security debates and security structures should bring together not only individual states, but also the EU, the OSCE, and the United Nations. The security challenges presented by the new forms of terrorism recognize no borders and require internationally agreed-upon and properly legitimized responses.
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