

Tolerance

VAKAT

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Tolerance

Basis for Democratic Interaction

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VAKAT

Preface

What is tolerance? – A virtue, an attitude or even an innate trait of character? Does it mean respect? Recognition? Indifference? Where does tolerance start, and where are its limits?

In fact, everybody has a different notion of the word “tolerance”. This was the case in earlier times and it continues to be the case today. For Goethe, tolerance was only a transitional attitude on the way to recognition. The social philosopher Herbert Marcuse sees it as an indifferent *laisser-faire* with the inherent danger of becoming an accomplice to power.

If the notion of tolerance is to be used in any kind of practical way, especially in the context of education for tolerance, as the Bertelsmann Foundation proposes to do in its project “Education for Democracy and Tolerance”, an action-orientated interpretation of the concept has to be found. Within the framework of this project, the Bertelsmann Foundation together with its co-operation partner, the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Policy Research (C·A·P) of Munich University, have jointly developed training programmes and teaching material and used these resources to train multipliers in the area of civic education in schools and non-school environments. In keeping with their motto “Learning from our neighbours!” they have looked over the garden fence in the process and have adapted successful concepts for education towards tolerance from other countries to fit the educational landscape in Germany.

Accompanying the project, the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research has developed a didactic concept for operationalising the meaning of tolerance, which we are submitting in this publication. The concept of tolerance presented here is the result of experiences collected in seminars and in numerous discussions with experts from educational science and practice. The focal point of the concept is the notion that tolerance is “a maxim for

the individual and ethically motivated decision to either endure a conflict or settle it by peaceful means, based on the conviction that the other parties to the conflict enjoy principally the same rights". One precondition for tolerant behaviour is thus first of all the existence and conscious perception of a conflict. Further basic conditions for tolerant ways of dealing with this conflict are specific capabilities and insights into the consequences of actions.

The concept of tolerance presented below is intended to help pedagogues within and outside schools as well as professionals – and not only in civic education – at universities to translate the difficult concept of tolerance into concrete educational practice. At the same time, it hopes to stimulate discussion about the crucial role education for democracy and tolerance plays in our world of many choices. The transnational activities of politics and business, the continuous progress in the development of technical means for the exchange of information, the acceleration seen in the transport of people and goods – all of this leads to an increasing obliteration of boundaries between states and cultures. The world is growing closer together and is experiencing fundamental change in the process. Against this backdrop education has been given the important task of teaching the basic skills and abilities indispensable for living with each other. These skills should enable people to orientate themselves in the world of tomorrow. Tolerance is a central pillar for the stability of democracy.

I wish to thank Susanne Ulrich, Eva Feldmann and Dr. Thomas R. Henschel for their substantial contributions in drawing up the concept below. In presenting this concept, I am also expressing my hope that it will give fresh impetus to the discussion about the notion of tolerance and on how to further the education for democracy and tolerance in civic education.

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1 Findings

1.1 Phenomena of intolerance

In the Federal Republic of Germany, almost two-thirds of the citizens criticise the way policies are implemented in the democratic system. In many cases, this criticism goes far deeper than dissatisfaction with political practices: it touches upon the system itself. One-third of all German citizens no longer see the advantages and fundamentals of a democratic system as valid.¹ These developments are *inter alia* reflected in the election successes of radical parties in state elections, but also in an increase in the number of violent offences reported to the police.²

However, the increasing number of phenomena of intolerance is not limited to the violent offences recorded in crime statistics. The disinclination to listen to others, growing aggressiveness and ostracism against socially disadvantaged, old and handicapped people have to be included here, as well as the lack of respect in dealing with foreign nationals. If such symptoms in connection with aggression against foreigners, political extremism or racism³

1 Stöss, R.: Unzufriedenheit mit der Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik, Wahlabsicht der Unzufriedenen und ihre Neigung zur Wahl rechtsextremer Parteien bzw. der PDS im Sommer 1998, Berlin 1998. In a survey conducted across Europe, five out of ten people in Germany were dissatisfied with the state of the democracy in the country. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, however, at least three quarters of those interviewed were satisfied with democracy in their respective country, cf. Eurobarometer no. 53, Jan. 6, Brussels 2000.

2 According to the 1999 police crime statistics, the cases of dangerous and serious physical injury have increased. In relation to their share of the total population, male adolescents of 16 years and older are represented disproportionately high in violent crimes.

3 In a Europe-wide survey 2/3 of respondents described themselves as holding "racial" beliefs, cf. Eurobarometer 47.1, Brussels 1997; cf. also: Heitmeyer, W. et al.: Gewalt. Schattenseiten der Individualisierungsprozesse bei Jugendlichen aus unterschiedlichen Milieus, 2nd edition Weinheim/München 1995. "Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt stagniert auf hohem Niveau", c.f. Verfassungsschutzbericht, Bonn 2000, p. 20.

are not taken seriously early on, they can develop into catalysts in a process endangering the foundations of the democratic social order.⁴

1.2 Causes of intolerance

Human beings are not equipped with social competence by nature.⁵ It is true that social interaction is one of the basic needs of human beings, the competence to deal with others, however, is something every single person has to acquire.⁶ To act in a rational way and to refrain from the use of violence in situations of conflict constitutes a great civil achievement, which does not come naturally.

Many causes leading to intolerant behaviour in modern societies can be traced back to lasting changes in social structures. These include:

- breaking apart of traditional relationships (families, clubs, etc.);
- quick change in orientation patterns (life styles, religious convictions, etc.);
- increased complexity of economic and social contexts (internationalisation, etc.).
- growth and increased speed in the exchange of information (new media, etc.).

These social changes contribute to a growing confrontation with diverging life-styles, opinions and attitudes, and are increasingly revealing their ambivalent character: on the one hand they lead to cultural, religious and ethnic variety, on the other hand, different ethical standards and values compete against each other and increase the potential for conflict within the society.⁷

The growing pluralism of our society makes many people feel insecure and perceive themselves as disadvantaged. The resulting dissatisfaction may lead to intolerant utterances and actions, especially if the chances for successful participation in democratic decision processes or protests are seen as unrealistic.⁸

In addition, plurality does not only mean being given the chance to pick and choose from a wide range of possible alternatives, very often it also means *having to choose*. Once the choice has been made, other alternatives are frequently rejected or even fought

4 The realisation not only led to a larger attention of the media towards this issue, but also to the creation of several governmental and non-governmental initiatives across Germany.

5 Cf. Otto, W. D. with reference to Mitscherlich, in: Wierlacher, A. (ed.): Kulturthema Toleranz – Zur Grundlegung einer interdisziplinären und interkulturellen Toleranzforschung, Munich 1996, p. 583.

6 Cf.: Kant, I.: Vom geselligen-ungeselligen Charakter des Menschen, in: Kant, I.: Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in Kant, I.: Werke in Sechs Bänden, (ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel), Band VI, Darmstadt 1983, p. 203. See also: Taylor, C.: Quellen des Selbst – Die Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Identität. Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 17 f.

7 Cf. Heitmeyer, W. (ed.): Was treibt die Gesellschaft auseinander, Frankfurt a. M. 1997.

8 Cf. Jacob, Susanne: Jugend und Politik, in: Frindte, W. (ed.): Fremde · Freunde · Feindlichkeiten, Wiesbaden 1999.

against in an act of self-assurance.⁹ Intolerant behaviour as a means of creating identity by dissociating oneself from others or as a reaction to frustration, excessive demands and stress is a possible result of these processes.¹⁰

Moreover, the plurality of competing, identity-creating orientation patterns makes the core of undisputed norms and standards appear smaller. Under these conditions it is very difficult to form a stable identity. A stable identity, however, is one of the basic prerequisites to allow an unprejudiced and unbiased approach to people and concepts perceived as different. The revaluation of one's own person by devaluating others may compensate for lack of self-confidence in the short term.¹¹ Intolerant attitudes or behavioural patterns may look more attractive that way. The phenomena of intolerance are thus not so much a direct consequence of social change but more often a reaction to the feelings of inadequacy and insecurity created by social change.

1.3 Promotion of tolerance

Nobody can withdraw from the process of increasing variety and individualism. Through the competition of different ways of life, cultures, religions, philosophies and ethnicities this process sharpens the perception of the transitory, limited and relative nature of all explanation patterns.¹² How can we assess and avoid the risk that result from that for as many members of a society as possible, though? How can the inherent advantages be made visible and available? What can be done to better prepare citizens for a multi-cultural society and to help them deal with its inherent conflicts? What measures need to be taken for people to participate in democratic decision processes and to see it as an exciting challenge and a worthwhile alternative to lack of interest and intolerance?

In every society individuals and groups compete for acceptance and resources. A crucial fundamental rule of democratic societies is that everybody has the same right to develop their abilities to the full. It is therefore a core aim of education for democracy to achieve the recognition of this right as a basic principle. In this context, it is irrelevant

9 Cf. Maroshek-Klarman, U.: *Erziehung zur Demokratie. Die Methode des ADAM-Institutes*, Jerusalem 1996, p. 10 (Supplement to: Ulrich, S., Henschel, Th. R., Oswald, E. (Adaptation): *Miteinander – Erfahrungen mit Betzavta*, Gütersloh 1996).

10 Fritzsche, K. P.: *Die Stressgesellschaft. Vom schwierigen Umgang mit der rasanten gesellschaftlichen Veränderung*, Munich 1998, p. 10.

11 Cf. also: Thomas, A.: *Ist Toleranz ein Kulturstandard*, in: Wierlacher, Alois (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 199 ff.

12 Cf. Arnold, R. und Siebert, H.: *Konstruktivistische Erwachsenenbildung – Von der Deutung zur Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit*, Hohengehren 1997, also cf. Siebert, H.: *Pädagogischer Konstruktivismus. Eine Bilanz der Konstruktivismusdiskussion für die Bildungspraxis*, Neuwied, Kriftel 1999.

whether the recognition in principle is inspired by transcendental-religious¹³, rational-enlightened¹⁴ or utilitarian¹⁵ motives. The questions to be asked is rather: How can conflicts created in a society by diverging life-styles, religions and cultures be settled in such a way that this principle can be implemented? An essential precondition for achieving this goal is a successful communication process. The basis for this process is tolerance.

In a tolerant society there is less fear, hostility and violence, less dogmatism, hatred and fanaticism. Tolerance allows the free development of human creativity and is thus an essential and indispensable building block for democratic societies. The promotion of tolerance on a societal and individual level¹⁶ is therefore a matter of necessity. On the level of the individual, tolerance skills have to be actively fostered. On the level of society, the corresponding political and social framework conditions have to be created. These include respectful behaviour towards each other as well as anti-discrimination rules. In addition, tolerance is a basic tenet of democracy, as it asks the central questions of how liberty and pluralism, rule of law and protection of minorities¹⁷ are guaranteed. It is also the precondition for the self-organisation of citizens outside the system of laws.¹⁸

In conclusion these thoughts may be grouped into three theses:

1. The democratic and pluralistic society is confronted with the paradox that it does not reproduce the preconditions for its existence out of itself. The necessary orientation and skills in peaceful conflict management rather have to be acquired by each member of society.
2. Education plays a pivotal role in ensuring this learning process.
3. The more people have acquired the comprehensive competencies for dealing with conflicts in a creative and tolerant way, the better the chances to constructively use the potential of conflicts within a society. This will improve the prospects not only of safeguarding the pluralistic and democratic social order but also of developing it further.

13 Cf. Küng, H.: *Global Responsibility in search of a New World Ethic*, London 1991.

14 "Act only accordingly to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.", in: Kant, I.: *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. 3rd edition, Indianapolis 1993, p. 30.

15 Cf. e.g. Maroshek-Klarmann, U.: *Die Methode des Adam-Institutes*, loc. cit.

16 Cf. Thomas, A.: *Ist Toleranz ein Kulturstandard*, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., pp. 200–202; cf. Resolution passed by the European Ministers of Education: Resolution (Nr. 2), 24 June 1997, ed. by Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

17 Cf. the verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court of December 17, 1975: *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts*, vol. 41. Tübingen 1976, p. 64.

18 Cf. Sutor, B.: *Kleine politische Ethik*, Bonn 1997, p. 67

2 Tolerance – maxim for non-violent settlement of conflicts

Current concepts developed in the field of tolerance research define tolerance as a cardinal virtue or mental attitude, but also as the scope for various types of behaviour, orientational value or cultural work.¹⁹ The terminological diversity of scientific approaches corresponds to the notional vagueness of the word in everyday language and emphatically calls²⁰ for a definition of issues, forms and limits of tolerance.

Starting point for a practice-oriented definition of tolerance in the context of civic education are human beings and their basic right to develop their abilities to the full. This basic right is part of the human rights.²¹ It guarantees each individual a maximum of freedom and diversity, and democratic societies the necessary pluralism. This pluralism allows, but also requires, a debate about the nature of differences and the decision for a personal life plan.

As acting subject, each single human being bears the responsibility for the consequences of his/her decisions.²² Especially in situations of conflict, the pressure to take suitable action is very high. In order to find orientation, it is necessary to have the relevant criteria, i.e. an activity guideline enabling people to better assess their own actions. Tolerance, defined as such a guideline, will retain its value beyond the single case decision and can thus provide orientation.

19 Cf. furthermore: Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz*, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 64.

20 Cf. Otto, W. D.: *Toleranzkultur und Pädagogik*, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., pp. 570, 581–583.

21 Cf. Voltaire: *Die Toleranz-Affäre*, edited and translated by Gier, A. u. Paschold, C. E., Bremen 1993.

22 Cf. Löwisch, D.-J.: *Toleranz – die Idee und ihre Wirkung auf ein modernes Freiheitsethos*, in: *Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 65 (1989), p. 285 and Bielefeldt, H.: *Menschenrechte und Toleranz*, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 121.

In accordance with the requirements of civic education, tolerance is therefore defined in this context as a *maxim*²³ for the individual and ethically motivated decision to either endure a conflict or settle it by peaceful means, based on the conviction that the other parties to the conflict principally enjoy the same rights. A conflict is always mutual negation, expressing rejection of the values and norms of the other person. Tolerance, defined as a maxim, leads to a search for a comprehensive perspective, which will allow the parties to the conflict to accept each others certainties – no matter how undesirable they may appear to the other side – as equally legitimate and valid. This acceptance will finally open up ways and means to realise these different needs side by side. Tolerance can thus be seen as the foundation for a democratic accord.

Tolerance defined in this way is not quantifiable. Individuals either orientate themselves along this maxim, or they do not. Questions aiming to define the degree of tolerance in certain types of behaviour or in people, or to classify certain types of tolerance become irrelevant. The focus shifts to the question of how far individuals are prepared to orientate themselves on the maxim of “tolerance”. This definition of tolerance is therefore fundamentally different from concepts describing a spectrum of tolerance or stages of tolerance and differentiate between active and passive, or strong and weak tolerance.²⁴ A definition that regards tolerance as a maxim and presumes responsibility of the individual neither assesses the behaviour of single individuals, nor does it take a moral high ground. As the decision taken by the individual also depends on his or her respective cultural context, this definition does not claim intercultural validity, either.²⁵ Its first and foremost aim is rather to devise a concept of tolerance that is applicable in civic education. This requires first of all a precise delimitation and identification of the most important criteria of tolerance.

2.1 Tolerance criteria

In order to identify clearly whether and when an attitude can be regarded as constituting a case of tolerance, three basic requirements have to be checked: precondition, procedure and motivation.

23 The definition of tolerance as a maxim is based on Kant’s categorical imperative, cf. Thomas, Alexander: Ist Toleranz ein Kulturstandard, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 181; Helfrich, H.: Toleranz und Kultur – Überlegungen aus psychologischer Sicht, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 122; Hill, D.: Lessing: die Sprache der Toleranz, in: Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift 64 (1990) pp. 218–246.

24 See Fritzsche, K.-P.: Toleranz im Umbruch – Über die Schwierigkeit, tolerant zu sein, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 32; Wierlacher, A.: Aktive Toleranz, loc. cit., p. 51 ff; Angehrn, E.: Toleranz. Forderung und Alltagswirklichkeit im Zusammenleben von Menschen verschiedener Kulturen, Basel 1993 and Helfrich, H. op. cit., p. 139.

25 On the question of universally applicable tolerance concepts and human rights see: Wierlacher, A.: Aktive Toleranz, loc. cit., p. 51 and Kühnhardt, L.: Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, Munich 1987, p. 384.

1. Precondition: The question of tolerance is only raised in situations of conflict.²⁶ The only time that the individual's own interpretation patterns, values and norms are questioned or violated is when they are confronted with deviant values or clashes of competing interests.
2. Procedure: The second criterion identifying tolerance is the absence of violence²⁷ in a case of conflict. Non-violent behaviour may be shown by only one side – in the sense of bearing the conflict – or by both sides in their relationship to each other.
3. Motivation: The motivation on which all thoughts and actions in a conflict are based is the third and most important distinguishing feature to identify tolerance. Only if they accept that every person has the same right to develop his/her abilities to the full²⁸ will individuals be able to either put up with deviance out of insight into its necessity, or jointly look for solutions to the conflict.

The tolerance criteria defined in this way implies that individuals are to assess their own actions, as motivation by its very nature can not be verified by third parties.

2.2 Completeness and exclusiveness of the tolerance criteria

The three tolerance criteria

- conflict,
- non-violence and
- acceptance of equal rights

outlined above have to be met completely and at the same time in order to allow a clear identification of tolerance. If conflict as initial criterion is missing from the set, as for instance in cases where the individual does not care one way or the other about others' values, this is not tolerance but indifference.²⁹ Some serious criticism directed at tolerance³⁰

26 Cf. Mitscherlich, A.: Toleranz – Überprüfung eines Begriffs, in: Freiheit – Eine Utopie? Ausgewählte Schriften 1946 bis 1974. Frankfurt a. M. 1974, p. 334 and tolerance concepts of Rest, W. (1948), Oetinger, F. (1953) and Giesecke, H. (1972).

27 On the question of non-violence see Harth, D.: Toleranz, kulturelle Gewalt und Gewalt der Kultur, in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 103; Heitmeyer, W. und Dollase, R. (ed.): Die bedrängte Toleranz – Ethisch kulturelle Konflikte, religiöse Differenzen und die Gefahren politisierter Gewalt, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, pp. 11–28; UNESCO Declaration of Tolerance, Art. 1.4, 5, op. cit. 1995.

28 Cf. UNESCO Declaration of Tolerance (Art. 1.2–1.4), 28th UNESCO General Conference, Paris 1995; Bielefeldt, Heiner 1996, op. cit., p. 122; Fritzsche, K.-P., op. cit., p. 47; Jaspers, K.: Philosophie (1931), second edition, Berlin et al. 1948, p. 671.

29 Cf. the so-called rejection-component (“Ablehnungs-Komponente”) in: Forst, Rainer (ed.): Toleranz, Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, in: Toleranz. Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend. Frankfurt a.M. 2000, p. 120.

30 Cf. criticism of indifferentism in: Löwisch, D. J., op. cit., p. 285 and Otto, W. D., op. cit., p. 601 and p. 609 ff. Martin Buber replaces the principle of tolerance with the principle of dialogue, cf. Buber, M.: Ich und Du, Heidelberg 1958.

in the sense of *laissez-faire* or anything-goes also becomes pointless vis-à-vis this understanding of tolerance as it springs from a blurred definition.

Completeness is not the only precondition for the tolerance criteria to be valid, a further point is their exclusiveness. Even if only one further criterion is added, e.g. the need to redress injustice, compassion or protection of rights, one's own and those of others, the result is no longer a case of tolerance but of solidarity, charity³¹ or the courage of one's convictions.

If orientation towards non-violence can be identified as a feature in a conflict, but the motivation is something other than the principal acceptance of the rights of others to develop their abilities to the full, only two of the necessary three tolerance criteria are met. Therefore the resulting action is not based on tolerance, even if the procedure does not look any different from tolerance when seen from the outside. This kind of action can best be described as seeming tolerance.³² The motivation for putting on a "semblance of tolerance",³³ is based on the wish to avoid having to deal with the conflict, a strategy which is regarded as justified for some reason. This is a matter of self-interest as a result of a cost-benefit, or rather, risk analysis. Reasons for seeming tolerance can be lack of time, feelings like sympathy or the need for harmony but also inferiority or superiority in hierarchical environments. Seeming tolerance can thus also be a means of refraining from dealing with a conflict or of postponing it to a later, more favourable date. This de-escalating aspect of seeming tolerance is essential in dealing with many everyday conflicts.

In distinguishing between tolerance and seeming tolerance on the one hand, and intolerance on the other, the use of violence is the most distinctive criterion to denote intolerance. In a case of conflict, intolerance is primarily used to push one's own interests. Violence in this context can mean anything from a spontaneous fit of rage to the use of subtle or open force, from deriding different opinions to actual bodily harm.³⁴

2.3 The limit of tolerance

The exclusiveness of the three tolerance criteria conflict, non-violence and acceptance of equal rights outlines the hermeneutic limits of tolerance.³⁵ By means of these criteria, tol-

31 Cf. Baumann, Z.: *Moderne und Ambivalenz*, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, p. 312.

32 In delimitation to stages of tolerance see inter alios: Fritzsche, K.-P., op. cit., p. 32 f.

33 In contrast to hypocrisy, which pretends agreement, seeming tolerance just puts a diplomatic gloss on rejection.

34 On the notion of violence see inter alios Galtung, J.; Lutz, D. S.; Röhrich, W.: *Überleben durch Partnerschaft. Gedanken über eine friedliche Welt*, Opladen 1990 and Galtung, J.: *Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln. Friede und Konflikt, Entwicklung und Kultur*, Opladen 1998, p. 341 ff.

35 On the problem of different opinions about the limits of tolerance cf. Bielefeldt, H., op. cit., p. 117; Löwisch, D. J., op. cit., p. 287; Fritzsche, K.-P., op. cit., pp. 38–40, 49; Wierlacher, A., *Aktive Toleranz*, loc. cit., p. 79.

erance can be distinguished from intolerance as its opposite, from seeming tolerance as its supposed equivalent and from anything else that goes beyond tolerance.³⁶

The opposing character of tolerance and intolerance consequently leads to the obvious limit of tolerance: the claim “No tolerance for intolerance”.³⁷ Applied to everyday situations, the personal limit of tolerance is always reached when the individual is confronted with intolerance. This means furthermore that condoning intolerant behaviour amounts to seeming tolerance.

As far as seeming tolerance and tolerance are concerned, the difference can only be established by looking at the motivation. As this can only be done at the individual level however, the border between tolerance and seeming tolerance will only become visible at this level. If this definition is to be followed, one point of criticism often voiced with respect to tolerance³⁸, aimed at its allegedly calculating character, does not concern tolerance itself but reflects the unease resulting from the impossibility of distinguishing tolerance from seeming tolerance in other people with any degree of certainty.

The civil character³⁹ of non-violent conflict settlement is a characteristic feature of democratic actions in the pre-law stages of the legal system in any society. The democratic rule-of-law principle ensures that the rights of the individual are guaranteed through the executive power of the state. If in a case of conflict the regulatory potential of the individuals concerned is exhausted and they want to adhere to the “tolerance” maxim, they will have to seek legal redress through the courts.

2.4 Options to act in conflicts

The following chart illustrates the key terms regarding the issue of tolerance in the concrete decision process of the individual.


36 On the question of power as opposed to force see Wierlacher, A.: Toleranzdiskurse in Deutschland in: Wierlacher, op. cit., p. 547.

37 Cf. Ricoeur, P.: Toleranz, Intoleranz und das Nicht-Tolerierbare, in: Forst, R. op. cit., p. 26 ff. and Notker, S.: Interkulturalität und Toleranz, in: Mall, R. A. et al. (ed.): Ethik und Politik aus interkultureller Sicht, Amsterdam, Atlanta 1996, p. 312.

38 Inter alios: Marcuse, H.: Repressive Toleranz, in: Wolff, R. P., Moore, B., Marcuse, H.: Kritik der reinen Toleranz, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, pp. 91–128.

39 See Fritzsche, K.-P. op. cit. 1996, p. 31.

Figure 1: Tolerance criteria



In any given case of conflict there are two options to act to start with: to bear the conflict or to settle the conflict.

2.4.1 Bearing conflicts

The decision to bear the conflict may be motivated by two different reasons: the benefit or risk analysis respectively, or the recognition of the principle of equal rights in developing one's personality. The result of the benefit or risk analysis respectively leads to the desire to avoid having to deal with the conflict. In exchange, the violation of one's own values and standards and the restriction of one's own rights is accepted and made light of. If this happens in a context of subordination or superiority, or in a hierarchical relationship,⁴⁰ fear of

40 Cf. Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz*, loc. cit., p. 54.

far-reaching consequences or patronizing attitude⁴¹ can play a role in such an uneven balance of power. But seeming tolerance may also seem opportune for reasons of effectiveness, as the settlement of conflicts takes time and perseverance. If, however, individuals orientate themselves along the “tolerance” maxim of their own understanding, they will for that very reason let others feel free to be different.

2.4.2 *Settling conflicts*

The decision not to bear a conflict but to settle it can in turn be based on two different motivations. If, again, acknowledgement of equal rights is the guideline to all actions, the individual will try to settle the conflict peacefully and by involving all other parties as far as possible. If force or violence are used in settling a conflict, this serves as a rule to predominantly push one’s own agenda. This defines intolerance as an expression of disregard for the claim to acknowledge equal rights to develop one’s abilities to the full.⁴²

Orientating oneself along the “tolerance” maxim thus comprises a *laisser-faire* attitude from insight as well as the non-violent settlement of conflicts. Both approaches are based on the recognition of equal rights as well as on the renunciation of violence. They both constitute instances of tolerance as they presuppose interest and an attempt to understand the other person.⁴³ For the individual, this means not only a moral but also a social effort.⁴⁴

Our daily interaction challenges the social competence of each individual to orientate himself along the “tolerance” maxim. As this competence is not innate,⁴⁵ it has to be acquired and taught by means of pedagogical concepts.

41 On the aspect of connivance see Goethe, J. W.: *Maximen und Reflexionen* Nr. 151 f. (1809/1829) in: *Hamburger Ausgabe*, Band 12, Hamburg, 1953, p. 385 and in opposition to Bubner, R.: *Zur Dialektik der Toleranz*, in: *Drei Studien zur politischen Philosophie*. Philosophisch-historische Klasse der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 11, Heidelberg 1999, p. 50.

42 Cf. Vollebergh, H.: *The limits of tolerance*, Utrecht 1991; unpublished doctoral thesis, quoted in Thomas, A. op. cit., p.196.

43 Cf. Lilje, H., Röhrich, R. and Mitscherlich, A., quoted in Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz*, loc. cit. 1996, pp. 70 ff.

44 Cf. Fritzsche, K.-Peter, op. cit. 1996, p. 34 and Weber, M.: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922), Tübingen 1985, p. 2.

45 With reference to Mitscherlich cf. Otto, W. D., op. cit. 1996, p. 583.

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3 Competence in tolerance

The non-violent settlement of conflicts requires competence in tolerance. This becomes even more important if the individual wants to avoid involving the police or the courts. In a functioning democratic society, this self-regulating capacity of citizens plays a pivotal role. In this context, competence in tolerance is a necessary precondition for dealing with conflicts in a responsible way.

Competence in tolerance can be promoted in specific ways by education and civic education in particular. Specific teaching of this skill must take place on the rational as well as emotional and task-oriented⁴⁶ level. Teaching competence in tolerance starts with comprehensive knowledge about tolerance and the general inclination for tolerance, as well specific skills in dealing with conflicts. In this process, the knowledge about tolerance⁴⁷ constitutes the basis for forming the inclination and the necessary skills. It helps the individuals to reassure themselves about the appropriateness of their decisions.

46 Cf. Nieke, W.: Interkulturelle Erziehung und Bildung. Wertorientierungen im Alltag, in: Schule und Gesellschaft Bd. 4, Opladen 1995, p. 212 and Helfrich, H. op. cit. 1996, p. 133.

47 Cf. Kippert, K.: Die pluralistische Gesellschaft als struktureller Bezugsrahmen für die Erziehung zur Toleranz, in: Kippert, K. (ed.): Gedanken zur Soziologie und Pädagogik, Festschrift für Ludwig Neundörfer zum 65. Geburtstag, Weinheim 1967, p. 33.

3.1 Knowledge about tolerance

Starting from a definition which describes tolerance as a maxim, knowledge about tolerance comprises:

- knowing the consequences of one's actions in a case of conflict, i.e. the advantages and disadvantages of intolerance, seeming tolerance and tolerance, and
- insights into the limits of tolerance as well as information about possible and necessary options to act, if the limit is reached.

3.1.1 *Consequences of intolerance*

The disadvantages of intolerance become especially obvious in the long-term view. Even if violent action leads to short-term success and reassurance, enforcing one's own agenda has negative consequences in the medium and long run. The reaction to intolerance can take the form of an escalation of the conflict. The rejection experienced by those exposed to intolerance may lead to their withdrawal. Further examples for setting off a spiral of violence⁴⁸ are: being excluded from a community (in extreme cases from society through prison sentences), intrigue or open rebellion. The person who uses intolerance to push his or her personal agenda cannot be sure that violence will not turn against him in the end.

Only one situation is an exception to this rule: a situation arising in connection with the protection of minorities. If a majority is intolerant towards a minority and there is neither a chance for the majority to change nor for the minority to obtain protection, then the possible consequences are irrelevant for the majority. Therefore it is a requirement for the democratic constitutional state to provide protection for minorities and to guarantee that majorities are reversible. When all is said and done, such a guarantee serves all members of a society, as a long-term suspension of the principal acknowledgment of equal rights to develop their abilities to the full leads to restrictions of liberty and security for minorities as well as for majorities.

3.1.2 *Consequences of seeming tolerance*

The decision in favour of seemingly tolerant behaviour may very well be appropriate for the individual for reasons of effectiveness or sensible caution. In certain situations respon-

⁴⁸ Cf. the de-escalation commandment in St. Matthew 5: 38–42.

sible action may require avoiding dealing with the conflict for the time being. In such cases of seeming tolerance, the individual has to bear in mind though that he or she renounces a permanent settlement of the conflict. The possible accumulation of conflict potential may then lead to symptoms of stress⁴⁹ and a sudden eruption of the conflict with unexpected vehemence. This carries the danger of affective actions, i.e. of unreflected, intolerant reactions.

3.1.3 Consequences of tolerance

The vital advantage of tolerance lies in the chance to settle and de-escalate a conflict successfully long-term. The maximum integration of the needs of others and their participation in the process guarantee the continuity of the settlement and lead to more security and satisfaction on both sides.⁵⁰ This approach requires a certain amount of time, energy and sensitivity to be invested in the process to start with, but the discussion of opposing views, combined with the necessary clarification of one's own point of view, may open up opportunities for self-reassurance and a strengthening of one's own identity.⁵¹

In addition, considering other positions provides the chance to perceive new perspectives and to incorporate them into one's own life.⁵² The relativization of one's own point of view which goes along with that, implies the ability and willingness for self-criticism and supports the development of one's own personality. It allows experiencing diversity as enrichment and removes the dilemma of having to decide between true and false.⁵³ The tolerant approach has the additional benefit that the energy which otherwise would have been spent on avoiding or resolving the conflict by violent means, can now be put into finding a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict. This means an increased degree of freedom for everybody involved in the conflict, provided the joint settlement does not lead to a compromise restricting people's rights but to a creative change in the situation,⁵⁴ satisfying everyone.

49 Cf. Badura, B. and Pfaff, H.: *Streß, ein Modernisierungsrisiko?*, in: K. Z. S. S. 1989, pp. 644–668.

50 Cf. Otto, W. D., *op. cit.*, p. 583; cf. also the standard studies by Deutsch, M.: *A theory of cooperation and competition, in human relations*, 2, pp. 129–152, 1949, as well as: *The Resolution of Conflict – Constructive and Destructive Processes*, Yale 1973, p. 20 ff and p. 179 ff.

51 Cf. Rahner, K.: *Über die intellektuelle Geduld mit sich selbst*, in: Stuhlmacher, D. and Abramowski, L. (ed.): *Toleranz*, Tübingen 1982, pp. 187–210.

52 Cf. Heckel, J.: *Frei sprechen lernen – ein Leitfaden zur Selbsthilfe*, München 1997, pp. 60–63.


53 Cf. Michel, W.: *Die Aussensicht der Innensicht. Zur Hermeneutik einer interkulturell ausgerichteten Germanistik*, in: *Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache* 17, 1991, p. 17; Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz*, *loc. cit.*, p. 73 and Juan, A. quoted in: Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz* *loc. cit.*, p. 73.

54 Cf. the theories on conflict resolution put forward by Rothman, J. and Goldratt, E. in Maroshek-Klarmann, U.: *Education for peace among equals without compromises & without concessions*, Jerusalem 1995, p. 42 ff and p. 60 ff.

The advantage of tolerance thus lies in the challenge it poses to creativity. Furthermore, tolerance also enables the individual to cope with situations of conflict alone, if necessary.

The following diagram may be used as a “tolerance traffic light” in civic education in so far as the colours red and yellow symbolise the danger zones of individual behaviour (intolerance and seeming tolerance) and green stands for the safe alternative (tolerance). This prevents education from pontificating, as it does not point out good or bad behaviour. It rather shows the personal consequences that result from the individual’s own behaviour, thus allowing individuals to make informed decisions about the kind of behaviour that is suitable in a given situation, and therefore, provides orientation.

Figure 2: Consequences of seeming tolerance, tolerance and intolerance



If the personal limit of tolerance is reached, i.e., if a non-violent, joint settlement of the conflict does not appear feasible, self-defence, courage of one's convictions or the use of police and/or legal power may outline the framework for adequate action.⁵⁵ These options first and foremost serve to protect the individual's rights and those of others and are put before the "tolerance" maxim in cases of emergency.

Comprehensive competence for tolerance thus includes being informed about these options as well as a sense of responsibility and the will and the courage to intervene.

3.2 Disposition to tolerance and specific capabilities for dealing with conflicts

Promoting the following capabilities will increase people's inclination to orientate themselves along the "tolerance" maxim:

- Competence for dialogue and communication;
- Capability of putting oneself in the position of one's counterpart;
- Capability of implementing models of constructive and democratic conflict-resolution.

Furthermore these capabilities, understood as important components of competence for tolerance, make it easier for the individual to take a courageous stance on intolerance. The aim of such a confrontation is to convince the other side to act in a non-violent manner as well and to recognise equality of rights. This includes the peaceful effort to better understand the other side. Responsible⁵⁶ and serious interest in the other side requires individual dialogue and communication skills. They provide the basis for the willingness to come to an understanding.⁵⁷ Apart from knowledge about the structure of communication processes,⁵⁸ they also comprise empathetic listening and the ability to voice one's own views, rights and needs in such a way that the other side can understand them. The aim of the "tolerance" maxim is not a harmony for harmony's sake, but rather the settlement of a conflict.⁵⁹

55 Courage to stand up for one's convictions is the private anticipatory move pre-empting the execution of the laws, can even be directed against the laws and will subsequently be legitimised in democratic states under the rule of law.

56 Cf. inter alios Buber, M., op. cit. and Liedke, M.: Bildungsaufgaben an der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend – Zielvorstellungen, Entwicklungstrends und anthropologische Rahmendaten, in: Seibert, N. and Serve, H. J. (eds): Bildung und Erziehung an der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend. Multidisziplinäre Aspekte, Analysen, Positionen, Perspektiven, München 1994, p. 208.

57 On the question of education criteria and objectives in teaching tolerance competence cf.: Hentig, H. v.: Bildung, Darmstadt 1997, pp. 73–100.

58 Vgl. insbesondere Schulz von Thun, F. (Die vierseitige Nachsicht – der vierohrige Empfänger): Miteinander reden 1, Hamburg 1981.

59 Cf. Heckel, J. op. cit., pp. 86–103.

A further precondition to achieve this aim is the insight into the principal limitation and subjectivity of any interpretation pattern.⁶⁰ Sensitivity for tacit assumptions, which can often lead to conflict-enhancing misunderstandings in human communication, constitutes a further necessary qualification. Examples for such tacit assumptions are conjectures about aims and requirements of the other parties or the widespread conviction that they have to emerge from this conflict either with a compromise or as winners and losers.

Another vital prerequisite for orientation along the tolerance maxim is the ability to change perspectives.⁶¹ This comprises, on the one hand, being able to see the world through the eyes of another person, and on the other hand, being able to see one and the same issue from different perspectives. In order to overcome stereotypical patterns of perceptions, the individual also has to be willing to perceive and experience diversity and its inherent contradictions. The precondition for achieving this is curiosity to experience differences and a reflective attitude towards one's own prejudices.

Tolerance as a clear rejection of "might makes right" provides an important basis for democracy. For everyday interaction between people it demands knowledge and the will to use constructive and democratic means for conflict settlement. The range of options for democratic actions corresponds to the great number of models for conflict settlement.⁶² These include methods for finding democratic decisions, like looking for a consensus, the decision to find a compromise, or majority decisions through voting. For consensus, there are two ideal scenarios: after the needs of all parties have been examined, consensus can, for instance, lead to the conclusion that there is no conflict after all, or to the decision to change the conflict-generating situation together.⁶³

Tolerance is always linked to a concrete counterpart and a concrete context. Competence for tolerance can therefore only be conveyed on the basis of a comprehensive experience of identity. Having a stable identity, the individual will not have to demean other people in order to increase his or her own value. Orientation towards tolerance therefore presupposes self-confidence and a strong ego.⁶⁴ The precondition for a balanced opinion of one's self-worth is learning to deal with one's emotions in a reflective way.⁶⁵ Identity, seen as self-definition, means the ability to relate to others. This is closely linked

60 On the question of epistemological modesty cf. Arnold, R. and Siebert, H. op. cit., p. 9 ff.

61 Cf. Mitscherlich, A. and M.: *Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens*. Munich 1967; Wierlacher, A.: *Aktive Toleranz*, loc. cit., p. 73; Fritzsche, K.-P. op. cit., p. 46.

62 These are to be distinguished from models of mediation, which look for a constructive solution for the parties involved in the conflict and accept a possible restriction of the rights of third parties, cf. in this context: Rubin, Jeffrey Z., Bunker, Barbara B. et al.: *Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice – Essays inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch*, San Francisco 1995.

63 Cf. Maroshek-Klarman, U.: *Erziehung zu Demokratie. Die Methode des Adam Institutes*, loc. cit., pp. 16–26.

64 Cf. Fritzsche, K. P., op. cit., p. 35.

65 Cf. Goleman, D.: *Emotionale Intelligenz*, Munich 1996.

to sociality, i.e. the ability to form communities and develop one's own personality within a community.

The individual's competence for tolerance will remain powerless if it does not meet with a social climate of tolerance. A resilient culture of tolerance is bound to the social consensus about a peaceful, democratic community life that recognises human and civil rights. In order to ensure sustainability, it has to be determined which type of institutionalisation will be required for education towards tolerance and which means that would guarantee participation of as many people as possible in the democratic decision process.

Education for democracy and tolerance does not only convey competence for tolerance in the narrow sense of the word. It also includes the strengthening of basic capabilities and the promotion of identity as its basic preconditions. In order to achieve this, specific and adequate methods need to be developed within the framework of a creative educational theory, orientated towards experience, knowledge and action.

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4 Implementation strategy

Promoting increased acquisition of competence for tolerance within the framework of civic education in school and out-of-school environments is the declared aim of education for democracy and tolerance. But how and through what channels can educational schemes promote tolerance? What didactic foundations exist and how can they be translated into teaching methods?

Each human being creates his or her own reality and acts on the basis of these self-designed patterns of perception.⁶⁶ Accepting this means that all offers of certainty become void, as anyone can claim to be in possession of the truth with the same degree of plausibility. If reality cannot actually be identified, then any debate about reality has become futile. What remains is the realisation that the individual is faced with radical plurality.⁶⁷ In order to counteract the dangers of “anything-goes” pedagogics, the question must be asked what objectives can education relating to the individual *and* to society⁶⁸ responsibly formulate. For didactics, this means that teaching skills in tolerance becomes the focus of educational interest. Through these skills, the individual will be able to treat the different interpretations in a relaxed and productive way. Tolerance thus becomes the keyword for dealing with diversity.

In order to convey competence for tolerance, teaching and learning methods have to be re-examined. The insight that it is not possible to identify an objective reality leads to

⁶⁶ Educational theory has adapted this approach, accepting that reality is virtually undeterminable. See the fundamental work of: Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit.

⁶⁷ Cf. in this context: Arnold, R. und Siebert, H., op. cit, p. 23.

⁶⁸ Cf. in this context: Watzlawick, P.: Die Möglichkeit des Andersseins. Zur Technik der therapeutischen Kommunikation, Bern 1991, p. 27.

the insight into the subjective nature and limitedness⁶⁹ of one's own patterns of interpretation. It also leads to the recognition of the fact that the certainties of others have to be regarded as just as valid and legitimate as one's own, even if they are inconvenient and uncomfortable.

This results in a call for pragmatic composure⁷⁰ which renounces any kind of objectivistic interpretation. Instead, education for democracy and tolerance turns to single processes of individual self-organisation and the concrete interpretations of teachers and learners. At the same time, educators have to get away from the notion that learning processes can be organised in such a way that the results of learning can be determined in advance and tested afterwards. Learning itself is seen as a self-organised process including both, teachers and learners.⁷¹

Another consequence of the insight into the fact that reality cannot be identified is that nobody can be sure of having understood the interpretation patterns of the other side correctly. Successful communication is therefore the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, teaching constructive ways of dealing with uncertainty must be seen as the basic pattern educational theory should strive to achieve.⁷²

As far as an educational concept for teaching tolerance is concerned, the above-mentioned outline helps us conclude that: it must⁷³

- prepare for seeing misunderstandings as normal occurrences;
- impart possible structures, characteristics and risks of communication in cases of conflict, thus enabling the individual to control his or her behaviour accordingly;⁷⁴
- initiate and promote learning and orientation processes through providing experiences of distance and difference;
- inform about the consequences of tolerance, seeming tolerance and intolerance;
- introduce and train alternative ways of conflict settlement;
- enable people to overcome differences through talk, exchange of opinion and negotiation;

69 On epistemological modesty and interpretation patterns in education cf. Arnold, R. and Siebert, H. op. cit., pp. 8, 11–12.

70 Cf. Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit., p. 21.

71 On requests for a change of paradigms in education cf. Arnold, R. and Siebert, H. op. cit., p. 62 ff., fundamental in this context is Luhmann's theory of systems, cf. Luhmann, N.: *Soziologische Aufklärung, 5. Konstruktivistische Perspektiven*, Opladen 1990.

72 In view of the "constructedness" of reality, dealing with other people always means dealing with "strangers". This means that all education becomes intercultural education and working with ethnic groups is only a part of intercultural pedagogics, see in this context also: Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit., p. 38.

73 On this catalogue of requirements cf. also Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit., pp. 137–154.

74 So-called reflexive learning, cf. in this context Arnold, R. and Siebert, H. op. cit., p. 142 ff.

- offer different ways of teaching: i. e., for instance “enabling” and “creating a framework for experience” instead of “instructing”;⁷⁵

What matters in the individual process of developing competence for tolerance is not so much that interpretation patterns come close to reality, but rather that they are adequate. Only the person acting can decide about the respective adequacy of his or her own interpretation patterns.⁷⁶ Teaching tolerance poses new challenges to teaching and learning. The project “Education for Democracy and Tolerance” takes up these challenges and translates them into practical approaches by means of innovative model seminars.

Working in the field of education for democracy and tolerance is a process consisting of a balanced combination of reassurance and uncertainty. The following four steps illustrate this approach:

1. developing awareness for one’s own interpretation and action patterns;
2. questioning one’s own interpretation and action patterns;
3. presenting alternative, democratic ways for a non-violent settlement of conflicts;
4. designing new interpretation patterns,⁷⁷ allowing action on the basis of the recognition of equal rights to develop one’s abilities to the full.

Interpretation patterns are stable components of the personality structure. They will only be called into question if explicit doubt is cast on them. By providing a protected environment in the form of a seminar or in the classroom, civic education offers ideal conditions for this process. Irritation⁷⁸ causes the individual to reconstruct his or her reality. Through the use of interactive exercises, seminars create a defined scope of experience which the individual perceives as doubts on his or her preconception. The doubts create a kind of crisis situation for the participants, which in turn makes them feel a need for new orientation and urges them to look for alternative ways of dealing with conflicts.

Having reached this point, the seminar will offer alternative courses of action for dealing with conflicts in a simultaneously democratic, non-violent and creative way. In addition, the necessary capabilities will be developed and used to make positive experiences in

75 Instead of “Forms of teaching certainty” – “Forms of teaching risk”, cf. in this context: Kösel, E.: Die Modellierung von Lernwelten. Ein Handbuch zur subjektiven Didaktik, Elztal-Dallau 1993, p. 30 ff.; cf. in this context also Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit., p. 148 f.

76 In this sense, the practice-orientated definition of tolerance and the demonstration of the consequences of actions in cases of conflict by means of “tolerance traffic lights” constitute instruments providing orientation in assessing the suitability of one’s own patterns of interpretation.

77 So-called reframing, cf. in this context Bandler, R. and Grinder, J.: Reframing. Ein ökologischer Ansatz in der Psychotherapie, Paderborn 1988, p. 13.

78 So-called perturbations, a term which was brought up in this discussion by Maturana and Varela in 1987. Perturbation can be translated – though not altogether congruently – as “disturbance”. “Perturbations are influences from the environment triggering cognitive processes.”, Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., op. cit., p. 115.

subsequent exercises. In the end this approach leads to new patterns of interpretation and thus to an expansion of the scope of action. Initiating this kind of long-term learning process increases the probability that the participants will in the future take a non-violent course of action in situations of conflict and become convinced of the principle of equal rights for all, i.e. will orientate themselves along the lines of the tolerance maxim.

It goes without saying that this type of educational work geared to teaching democracy and tolerance also presupposes new forms of facilitation and makes special demands on the pedagogues.⁷⁹ The facilitation process intervenes by revealing the diversity of perspectives, unfamiliar and enriching perspectives by asking provocative, forward-moving questions and by drawing the attention to points of view that have been overlooked. This means furthermore that educators need to develop a certain specific composure with respect to the learning process, which will enable participants to draw their own conclusions from the experiences gained. Finally the facilitators have to ensure that the line between controlled uncertainty and injury is not overstepped.

The education models that are provided within the framework of the co-operation project “Education for Democracy and Tolerance”, run by the Bertelsmann Foundation in conjunction with the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Policy Research (C · A · P) at the University of Munich, meet these requirements.

79 On this catalogue of requirements cf. also the corresponding expositions by Arnold, R. and Siebert, H., *op. cit.*, p. 137 ff.

5 Diagram

C o n c e p t o f T o l e r a n c e

DIAGNOSIS	OBJECT	APPROACH	IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
<p>The individual is overwhelmed and feels disconcerted</p> <p>Consequence:</p> <p>Phenomenon of intolerance in connection with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ostracism ● Aggression ● Violence <p>Background:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Change of patterns of orientation ● Disintegration of traditional relationships ● Growing pluralism, increasing multiculturalism and individualisation ● Increasing complexity of economic, political and social contexts ● Division of society in “winners” and “losers” of modernisation ● Expansion and acceleration of information and communication 	<p>Tolerance as maxim for the individual decision to either endure a conflict or settle it through non-violent means</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Tolerance is based on the principal recognition of the right of individuals to develop their abilities to the full. ● The non-violent settlement of conflicts can either be adopted by only one party or jointly by all parties to the conflict. ● Joint settlement requires interest in the concerns of the other party and an effort at better understanding. <p>Peaceful settlement of conflicts prior to applying the rule of law requires tolerance.</p> <p>The limits of tolerance are reached when it no longer seems possible to bear a conflict that cannot be solved jointly by peaceful means.</p> <p>Intolerance is settlement of conflicts by using violence primarily in order to push one’s own interest.</p> <p>Seemingly tolerance avoids a settlement of the conflict based on a benefit-risk analysis.</p>	<p>Imparting competence for tolerance by means of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Experiencing identity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Self-definition – Self-esteem – Sociability ● Acquisition of competence for dialogue and communication (successful communication) ● Learning to take somebody else’s point of view (change of perspective) ● Knowledge and will to use constructive and democratic means of conflict settlement <p>Strengthening the citizens’ capacity for self-regulation by imparting knowledge about tolerance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The opportunities and limits of tolerance ● The actions to opt for when the limits of tolerance are reached (courage of one’s convictions, legal means) ● The consequences of intolerance and seeming tolerance 	<p>Development of a pedagogical approach offering creative experience, knowledge and task-oriented education</p> <p>Pedagogical approach (four-step model)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Raising awareness for one’s own interpretation and action patterns 2. Questioning one’s own interpretation and action patterns 3. Offering alternative, democratic means for dealing with conflicts in non-violent ways 4. Designing new interpretation patterns <p>Practical implementation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Model seminars ● Teaching manuals ● Establishing networks ● Research, translation and adaptation of seminar models used by international partners ● Publication of model seminars as practical manuals ● Initial and further training of multipliers ● Implementation of project results into the regular educational curriculum ● Informing and raising the sensitivity of the general public

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