The Center for Applied Policy Research (C·A·P) in Munich, and the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels held a roundtable with experts from the United States and Europe to discuss the chances of - and the challenges for - a transatlantic approach to Iran. The roundtable, entitled "Iran's role in the Greater Middle East: options for a transatlantic approach," was part of the C·A·P's Improving Responsiveness project, a cooperation of the C·A·P with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The German Marshall Fund of the United States is an American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to developing ideas, leaders and institutions necessary for an effective long-term partnership between the United States and Europe. The C·A·P would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the United States for their generous support of the Transatlantic Roundtable Program as part of a Key Institution Grant to the C·A·P.

Josef Janning and Gordon Gray

Summary paragraph

Recent developments in Iran have fuelled widespread concern and increased the pressure on the international community to find a solution to the political, security and economic challenges arrousing from Iran and the whole Middle East Region. Participants in a Transatlantic roundtable co-hosted by the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich and the EPC in Brussels stressed that Iran is an important foreign policy issue at hand for the European Union, the United States and the democratic world at large. This two-day event addressed a range of issues, with particular focus on Iran's nuclear programme and its international implications. Options for a transatlantic approach towards Iran and the Greater Middle East were also discussed, focusing on the next steps the EU and US should take in the current, critical situation.

Event report

Iran in the Greater Middle East – regional and domestic developments

The roundtable opened with an overview of the current political situation from a domestic, regional and transatlantic perspective.

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian civil society has been dominated by a continuous conflict between two coalitions - the "Reformers" and the "Conservatives". This conflict was underlined and reinforced by the debate on "justice" in the recent elections: the Reformers campaigned for "political justice", meaning the extension of freedom and participation; while the Conservatives insisted on "social justice", focusing on economic development and a fair distribution of resources.

Bruno Tertrais, Thomas Bauer and Jon Wolfsthal

The "Islamic Republic" is based on two contrary elements: a theocratic and a democratic component. There are non-elected institutions which reflect the theocratic element, where sovereignty lies with God, going back to the concept of the rule of the jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih) as developed by the late Ayatullah Khomeini. On the other hand, democracy demands that the people are sovereign, which implies that the political structure of an "Islamic Republic" has to combine these two elements. Therefore, the Iranian constitution established elected institutions with popular legitimacy (president and parliament) as well as non-elected institutions with clerical legitimacy.

Since the revolution, the Conservatives have occupied positions in the non-elected institutions and a shift in power, driven by a Conservative campaign, has weakened the Reformists. This culminated in the election to the presidency of the neo-conservative and populist Mayor of Tehran,
Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad. He combines a deference to the conservative clerical establishment – most importantly, to the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei – with a revolutionary zeal aimed at religious justice and material redistribution reminiscent of the early days of the Islamic revolution.

The regime currently appears to be stable and the international community should not expect any major changes in the domestic situation. The Conservatives will, however, have to improve
the population’s economic situation. Although the Reformists' position has been weakened, they remain in the political background working for an improvement in general freedom and civil liberties.

Iran does not currently face any immediate threats on its borders and is therefore in a relatively powerful position in the region. Furthermore, the regime’s attention is focused on national interests, which explains its weaker foreign policy stance and strategy under Ahmadi-Nejad's leadership. It should also be noted that Ahmadi-Nejad has only limited influence over foreign policy, as this is the responsibility of the Supreme Leader. Foreign policy matters are also dominated by the National Security Council, where the President is only one of several actors.

Participants pointed out that Iran is striving to increase its influence in the region, especially within Shi'I and Persian communities in the Middle East and Central Asia. Within this context:

It would like Iraq to be as weak as possible without falling into complete chaos, to avoid a spill-over of conflicts.
It does not want to see a break-up of Iraq since formal independence for Iraqi Kurdistan could increase Iran's problems with its own Kurdish minority.
It would like to see a large, Shi'I-dominated Southern province with maximal powers, which would control the bulk of Iraq's oil reserves.

Within the transatlantic context, the key issues discussed were Iran's nuclear programme, its support for terrorist groups, its hostility towards Israel and its domestic human rights record

The US has addressed a number of these problems through a dual containment strategy, while the EU has focused on building a partnership with Iran, creating dialogue and improving economic relations. In 1998, a comprehensive dialogue was established with the aim of fostering limited cooperation in special areas. Following Mohammad Khatami's re-election as president in 2001, the EU changed its strategy and began talks on a "Trade and Cooperation Agreement" in 2002. However, the negotiations stopped in 2003 when the nuclear issue escalated.

Overall, participants noted that neither the US approach of using sticks nor the EU approach of using carrots has led to progress on the nuclear issue. They also discussed the change in the orientation of Iranian foreign policy. It was stressed that Iran suffers from a great feeling of insecurity and a deep lack of trust within society. Iran has been exploited in the past, but never reaped any of the benefits of colonisation.

Assessing Iran’s nuclear programme: international implications

Stanley Crossick
There is great concern that a nuclear Iran might not only lead to proliferation in the region, but also increase the risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists, given Iran's known relations with terrorist networks.

Furthermore, the crisis has been sparked not just by fears of nuclear proliferation, but also by Iran’s track record and its past behaviour. Iran has repeatedly breached international norms, and, to date, has never had to pay a price for its behaviour (unlike Libya and Iraq). This has encouraged certain elements in Iran to believe that they can push the nuclear issue further.

However, participants acknowledged that little is known about whether Iran has a clandestine programme to develop such weapons, although there is a widespread assumption that it does – or will soon have one. In this context, there is growing speculation as to how long it will take. Some believed there was a possibility that Iran could produce a nuclear bomb within 6-12 months; however, a more realistic estimate, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would be 5-10 years.

At the regional level, a nuclear Iran would probably lead to further proliferation in the Middle East region (for example, in Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Iran would also become more influential in the region. At the global level, the crisis could have deep repercussions for the North-South divide.

Iran argues that the enrichment process is a means of modernising the country and reinforcing its sovereignty – an argument which was also used by Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s.

A transatlantic approach? EU and US policy towards Iran and the Greater Middle East

Overall, participants felt that the nuclear issue had been badly mismanaged by the EU and the US. In the past two years, the Union - and in particular the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) - have launched a number of confidence-building initiatives, but these have not been very successful, partly because the incentives to comply with the Union’s demands were not sufficient and partly because the EU did not have the means to put sufficient pressure on the Iranian regime. Three possible options for action were discussed:

The application of sanctions (in the form, for example, of an oil embargo or targeted financial sanctions.) If sanctions were to be introduced, participants felt that the G7 or G8 would offer a more appropriate framework for this than the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, they agreed that India would have to play a key role in this, because of Iran's dependence on India for oil refinery and gasoline. The EU would, however, need to consider what implications any sanctions imposed on Tehran would have for Turkey, because of its dependence on Iran for oil and natural gas. Participants also expressed considerable doubt that sanctions would be the right tool to get Iran to comply with its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
A preventive strike. This option was not considered realistic at the moment. However, participants felt that while military intervention could be disastrous, an Iran with nuclear weapons would be even worse.
Offering greater incentives. Participants felt the 'carrots' offered by the US and the EU so far had been inadequate.

The Iranian situation has also focused attention on the fundamental question of whether or not it is possible to dissuade a non-ally state from going nuclear. The 'negative' security offered by the US to North Korea – in the shape of a promise not to attack it – has had a genuinely positive impact on the North Koreans, but would it have the same effect on Iran?

There is an on-going debate over whether Iran should be referred to the UN Security Council. Participants felt this could only be successful with the backing, in particular, of Russia and China – and neither have so far demonstrated support for tougher measures. Discussions are needed on how to get these two nations on board.

However, participants stressed that there is no hope of any solution if the US and the EU do not act together.